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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to
the order of the Utah Supreme Court dated June 13, 1988, and
Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1987).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
This is

an

appeal from

a

Judicial District Court of Salt
granting Respondent Brighton
Stay of

Proceedings

final order

the

Third

Lake County, State of

Utah,

Bank's Motion

under

Utah Code

of

for Relief

from

Section

7-2-7

Ann.,

(1987).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the

in granting Brighton

Bank

relief from the automatic stay of Section 7-2-7, of the

Utah

Code in

even

order

lower court err

to proceed

with

through Brighton Bank's senior

its trust

deed

sale

lien interest was

adequately

protected by a $65,000 "equity cushion" in the real
at issue
State's

and in

spite

depositors

of the

through

property

irreparable harm

to

Copper

extinguishment

of

Copper

the

State's junior lien interest?

2.
Copper

Did

the

State's

lower court

depositors

afforded under Section 7-2-7

err

with

in refusing

the

special

to

protections

to depositors of failed

1

provide

thrift

institutions chartered
express legislative

in Utah,

intent to

especially in

view of

preserve assets

of a

the

failed

thrift in order to maximize the return to depositors?

3.

Did

the lower

court err

federal bankruptcy law in
7-2-7 in view of

preservation

consider

liquidation

Section

of the United

well-developed body

and

to

interpreting and applying

the analagous intent

Bankruptcy Code, the
the

in refusing

of

of law
assets

States

concerning

provided

by

federal bankruptcy decisions, and even though the language of
Section 7-2-7 is

virtually identical to

the automatic

stay

provision of the Bankruptcy Code?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann,, Section 7-2-7 (1987):
(1)

Except as otherwise specified in Subsection (2), a

taking of an institution or other person by the
under

this

commencement

Chapter
or

shall

operate

continuation

as

of:

a

(a)

Commissioner
stay

any

administrative, or other proceeding against the
including service
judgment against

of process;
the

possession of property

(b)

institution;
of or from

the

institution,

enforcement of

(c) any

institution;

(e)

any act

act

to

2

collect,

any

obtain

the institution; (d)

to

the

judicial,

act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against
of the

of

any

property

assess,

or

recover a claim against the

institution; and (f) the

of any

institution

debt

owing

to the

against the institution.

Upon

and hearing,

may, for

the

court

against

setoff

any

application and after
cause

shown,

claim
notice

terminate,

annul, modify, or condition the stay.

Utah

Code

Ann.,

Section

7-1-102,

(1987)

(set

forth

in

(1987)

(set

forth

in

relevant part in brief, p. 21-22)
Utah

Code

Ann.,

Section

7-1-301,

relevant part in brief, p. 22)
Utah Code Ann., Section 7-20-1, (1987) (set forth in relevant
part in brief, p. 22-23)
11 U.S.C., Section 362 (set forth in Addendum, p. A-10)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is

an

appeal from

a

final order

of

the

Third

Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard
H. Moffat,

granting Respondent

Brighton Bank's

Relief from Stay of Proceedings under

Motion

for

Utah Code Ann. Section

7-2-7, (1987), thereby allowing Brighton Bank to proceed with
a non-judicial foreclosure of certain property against

which

Appellant Grant Thornton & Co. (hereinafter "Grant Thornton11)
as

receiver/liquidator

of

Copper

State

Thrift

&

Loan

(hereinafter "Copper State") holds a junior lien interest.

3

The Third Judicial District Court issued its final Order
Modifying Stay of
March 8, 1988.

Section 7-2-7(1), Utah

The Notice of

Code Annotated

Appeal was filed on March

on
25,

1988.
B.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Copper

State is

(hereinafter "Copper

State

Afton Wright (hereinafter
1983.

the holder

of a

Promissory

Note") executed
"Wrights") on or

The Copper State Note was

by

Note

Willis

and

about March

29,

secured by a Deed of

(hereinafter "Copper State Trust Deed") executed by

Trust

Wrights,

as trustors, in favor of Copper State, as beneficiary, on

or

about March 29, 1983 describing real property located at 2500
Walker Lane, Salt Lake County, Utah (hereinafter "Property").
(Findings of Fact No. 1, Record at 1484.)
2.

On or about September 12, 1983, Wrights executed, as

trustors, a Trust Deed Note (hereinafter "Brighton Note") and
Trust Deed (hereinafter

"Brighton Trust Deed")

Brighton Bank describing the Property.

in favor

of

(Findings of Fact No.

2, Record at 1484.)
3.

On or about October 11, 1983, Copper State agreed to

subordinate the Copper State Trust
Brighton Trust

Deed.

(Findings

Deed
of Fact

to the lien of
No. 3,

the

Record

at

of

the

State of

Utah

1484.)
4.

In

Department of

December,

1986,

the

Financial Institutions

4

Commissioner
of the

commenced a proceeding under Title

7, Chapter 2 of the

Code, and took possession of Copper State.

Utah

Thereafter

Grant

Thornton was appointed receiver/liquidator of Copper State.
5.

The

Wrights

defaulted

on

their

obligations

Brighton Bank and Copper State and on or about May 30,

to

198 6,

Brighton Bank served on the Wrights and recorded a Notice

of

Default in preparation for a non-judicial foreclosure of

the

Property under the

Brighton Trust Deed.

(Findings of

Fact

No. 4, Record at 1484.)
6.

On

or

Brighton Bank's

about September
foreclosure

26,

of the

1986, in
Property,

response
the

to

Wrights

filed their petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code.

(Findings of

Fact No. 5, Record

at

1484.)
7.

By

Order dated

September

7, 1987,

Brighton

obtained relief from the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C.
3 62 in the

Wrightfs bankruptcy

proceeding to

8.

Section

permit it

proceed with its non-judicial foreclosure under the
Trust Deed.

Bank

to

Brighton

(Findings of Fact No. 6, Record at 1484.)

On or about September 22, 1987, the Bankruptcy Court

granted relief from the Automatic Stay in Wrights1 bankruptcy
proceeding

to

foreclosure of
Deed.

permit

Copper

the Property

State

under

to

proceed

the Copper

(Findings of Fact No. 7, Record at 1485.)

5

with

State

its

Trust

9.

On November

18, 1987,

Wrights and recorded in
Lake County,

State

Copper State

the office of

of Utah,

as

served on

the

the recorder of

part of

its

Salt

non-judicial

foreclosure of the Property, a Notice of Default.

(Findings

of Fact No. 8, Record at 1485.)
10.

The

fair market

Hundred Thousand

Dollars

value of

the Property

($300,000.00)

as

Brighton Bank's appraisal dated June 11,

is

Three

established

1987.

by

(Findings of

Fact No. 9, Record at 1485.)
11.

As

approximately
$47,000.

of February,
$235,000

Together, the

State against

the

1988, Wright
and

Copper

owed Brighton
State

claims of Brighton

Property

total

Bank

approximately
Bank and

approximately

Copper

$282,000.

(Findings of Fact No. 10, Record at 1485.)
12.

The Property is declining

age, its lack

of occupancy,

in value because of

a general decline

estate market, and other factors.

its

in the

real

(Findings of Fact No.

11,

Record at 1485.)
13.

The

value of

the Property

is being

consumed

ongoing interest accruing on the obligations of Copper
and Brighton Bank, and by other claims against the

by

State

Property.

(Findings of Fact No. 12, Record at 1485.)
14.

There

interest will not

is

no

evidence

that

continue to accrue

6

would

suggest

and continue to

that
erode

the "equity cushion."

(Findings of Fact

No. 13, Record

at

1486.)
15.

Considering only

the claims of

Brighton Bank

and

Copper State, which together total $282,000.00, and the value
of the Property at $300,000.00,
"equity cushion".
16.

there is only an

$18,000.00

(Findings of Fact No. 14, Record at 1486.)

This $18,000.00 cushion will probably be more

than

absorbed by known

but unascertained

and other claims.

(Findings of Fact No. 15, Record at 1486.)

17.

costs, attorney's

fees

On or about December 3, 1987, Brighton Bank filed a

Motion for Relief

from Stay of

Proceedings under Utah

Code

Ann., Section 7-2-7, (1987), which motion came on for hearing
on December 18, 1987, before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat,
Third Judicial District Court Judge.
18.

After

submitted by

both

Moffat filed his
March 8,

considering

1988,

Copper

oral

the

court

arguments

State and

Minute Entry

(Record at 1037-1083.)

Brighton

on January 27,

issued

its

and

memoranda

Bank,

Judge

1988, and

Findings

of

on

Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Final Order Modifying Stay of Section
7-2-7(1), Utah Code Annotated (1987), allowing Brighton
to proceed with its non-judicial foreclosure of the
under the Brighton Trust Deed.

7

Bank

Property

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court

erred in

finding as a

matter of

fact

that the "equity cushion" protecting the Brighton Trust

Deed

was only $18,000.

Because Brighton Bank's lien is senior

to

all other

the value

to

liens,

of

the Property

available

protect the Brighton Trust Deed is the difference between the
amount due under the Brighton
of the Property ($300,000).

Note ($235,000) and the

value

Therefore, there is a $65,000.00

equity cushion in the Property to protect Brighton Bank.
The $65,000

equity

Brighton Bank's
interest and

lien

cushion is

in the

costs, for

sufficient

Property,

at least

to

protect

including

the next

accruing

two (2) years.

While the existence of junior liens impacts on the net equity
of the Property, such liens can
upon the

increasing value

in no way impair or

of Brighton

Bank's senior

Brighton Bank would not be financially damaged by
of the Section

7-2-7 stay and

impinge
lien.

imposition

would eventually realize

the

full benefit of its bargained-for senior lien interest.
The statements of the
statutory purpose and
Utah Code, evidences
depositors of
7-2-7

was

institution for
court failed

intent of

to

Title 7, Chapter

a clear legislative

failed

enacted

Utah Legislature and the

financial
to

preserve

the benefit
recognize

of its

8

assets

of

the

protect

and

depositors.

the special

2 of

intent to

institutions,
the

express

Section
a

The

protections

failed
lower
to

be

afforded such depositors, thus emasculating the provisions of
Title 7, Chapter 2 and specifically Section 7-2-7.
By granting the

motion for relief

from stay,

Brighton

Bank is now free to proceed with its foreclosure action which
will

ultimately

result

in

the

extinguishment

of

Copper

State's junior lien interest.

As a result, the depositors of

Copper State

a

will

be denied

valuable asset

that

would

otherwise be available to help satisfy their claims.

In

the

absence of

of

the

injury

to Brighton

Bank

and in

light

Property's significant value, the interests of Brighton

Bank

and Copper State's depositors can be fully realized through a
reinstatement of the Section 7-2-7 stay.
The stay of
the language of
provision
sections

of
of

Section 7-2-7 is
11 U.S.C.

the

United

Title

7,

Section 3 62,
States

Chapter

provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy
7-2-7's obvious nexus

based almost verbatim
the automatic

Bankruptcy
2

are

likewise

Code.

with the U.S.

Code.

stay
Other

based

In view of

on

on

Section

Bankruptcy Code and

in

the absence of controlling state law, federal bankruptcy law,
as a sophisticated and complete body of law dealing with
liquidation
assets, is

and

distribution

of assistance

Section 7-2-7

stay.

of

an

insolvement

in interpreting

Federal

granting relief from the stay

bankruptcy

entity's

and applying
law

requires

that the interests of

the

the
in

secured

creditors be balanced against the interest of other creditors

9

who will benefit from
case, Brighton Bank

an enforcement of

would not

result of the stay and
be denied the benefit

the stay.

be financially

In

damaged as

the depositors of Copper State
of a valuable asset

not enforced.

10

this

if the stay

a

would
were

ARGUMENT
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT BRIGHTON BANK'S
"EQUITY CUSHION11 IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE VALUE
OF BRIGHTON BANK'S LIEN PLUS COPPER STATE'S JUNIOR LIEN
AND THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY.
On December 18, 1987, Brighton Bank's Motion for

Relief

From Stay of Proceeding Under Utah Code Ann., Section

1-2-1,

(1987) came on for hearing
was

not

reported

available.

By

and

no

its motion,

from the automatic
1-2-1

in the lower court.
transcript

of

Brighton Bank

stay imposed by

The

the

hearing

hearing

requested

is

relief

Utah Code Ann.,

Section

(1987)(hereinafter "Section 7-2-7") in order to proceed

under the Brighton Trust Deed with a non-judicial foreclosure
of the Property, which was also encumbered by Copper
junior lien interest
Deed.

As

represented by the

more particularly

Facts above, Copper

Copper State

described in

State is currently

State's
Trust

the Statement

in receivership

liquidation proceedings pursuant to Utah Code Ann.,

of
and

Sections

7-2-1 et seq. (1987).
In support of
alia, that since

its motion, Brighton
Brighton Bank

Bank argued,

had a lien

inter

interest in

the

Property superior to the lien of the Copper State Trust Deed,
either Brighton
Brighton Trust

Bank should
Deed or,

in

be permitted

to foreclose

the alternative,

Copper

should be required to make monthly payments to Brighton

11

the
State
Bank

pursuant to the

terms of the

Brighton Note.

Brighton

Bank

argued that it "should not be left in limbo for an indefinite
period of time while its collateral continue[s] to depreciate
in value."

(See Reply Memorandum

of Brighton Bank, page

6;

Record at 1172).
In opposition to Brighton Bank's motion, Grant

Thornton

argued that the stay of Section 7-2-7 was intended to
all actions affecting

the Property

Thornton sufficient time

to sell

in order
the Property

enjoin

to give

Grant

at its

fair

market value and to prevent the expenditure of Copper State's
meager assets to

protect it's junior

lien interest.

Grant

Thornton asserted that Brighton Bank would not be harmed by a
continuation of

the

stay

because

cushion in the Property was
accruing interest and
other hand,

automatic stay

Bank's

equity

more than adequate to cover

costs on

if Brighton

Brighton

the Brighton

Note.

the

On

the

Bank was

granted relief

from

the

7-2-7,

Grant Thornton

would

be

of Section

forced to pay the Brighton Note of approximately $2 35,000, or
Copper State's junior lien interest of approximately
would

be

eliminated

as

a

result

of

Brighton

$47,000
Bank's

foreclosure sale, thus denying Copper State's depositors
benefit of Copper State's interest in the Property.
inequitable result, Grant

Thornton argued, is

Such

not what

the
an
the

Utah Legislature intended in enacting Section 7-2-7 to effect
a stay of proceedings against property of a failed depository

12

institution

such

as

Copper

State.

(See

Memorandum

In

Opposition To Motion For Relief From Stay, page 9; Record

at

1118.)
The lower court rejected Grant Thornton's arguments
granted Brighton Bank's
7-2-7.

motion to lift

On March 8, 1988,

of Fact,

Conclusions of

the stay of

the lower court made its
Law, and

entered its

Modifying Stay of Section 7-2-7(1),

and

Section
Findings

final

Utah Code Ann.

Order

In

that

Order, the court found as follows:
Considering only the claims of Brighton Bank and Copper
State, which together total $282,000.00, and the value
of the Property at $300,000.00, there is only an
$18,000.00 "equity cushion".
(Findings of Fact No. 14; Record at 1486.)
The lower

court

"equity cushion"
interest in the
"[t]his

further
was

Property.

$18,000.00

claims."

that

that

protected

The lower

cushion

absorbed by known but
and other

all

determined

will

this

$18,000.00

Brighton

Bank's

court also found

probably

more

than

unascertained costs, attorney's

fees,

(Findings of

Fact

be

that

No. 15, Record

at

1486.)
Ordinarily, a lower court's
be disturbed
evidence.

if it

on substantial

and

whether

together to

In the present
there are

construct the

219,

case, however, it is not

facts

which could

challenged finding,

13

not

competent

Smith v. Utah Central Credit Union, 727 P.2d

220 (Utah 1986).
matter of

is based

finding of fact should

be
but

a

strung
whether

sound reasoning, in light of commonly understood
supports the lower court's finding.

principles,

The evidence as to

the

amounts owed Copper State and Brighton Bank and the value
the Property

is

definition of

not

in

dispute.

"equity cushion"

Bank's lien interest

At

as

issue

here

it applies

in the Property.

to

of

is

the

Brighton

It appears that

the

lower court arrived at its determination of equity cushion by
subtracting

the

total

indebtedness

Brighton Bank ($282,000.00)
($300,000.00).

Such

an

to

Copper

from the value

approach

State

of the

presupposes

and

Property

that

Copper

State's junior lien somehow impacts upon or decreases

either

the value of Brighton Bank's lien or the amount of equity
the

Property

protecting

Brighton

Bank's

lien.

in

Neither

supposition, however, is true.
Well-reasoned decisions from
Brighton

Bank's

equity

difference between the
Brighton Note and
value of

the

cushion

other courts would
in

the

Property

amount owed Brighton

Brighton Trust

Property.

cushion and the protection

Such a

Deed and
definition

define
as

the

Bank under

the

the fair
of

an

market
equity

it affords senior lienholders

is

described in a recent decision of the Ninth Circuit Court

of

Appeals.

In the

case of

In re Mellor, 734

F.2d 1396

(9th

Cir. 1984) the holder of a first trust deed in the amount

of

$66,700.00 sought relief from the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C.
Section 3 62

as to

property having

14

a fair

market value

of

$105,000.00.

The

property at issue
excess of

lower

of the

by other

holder was not

the lower courts,

the Ninth

that the first lienholder

that

property, the

from the stay was appropriate.

stay through

found

was encumbered

the value

first trust deed

courts

because

the

junior liens

in

interest of

the

being protected and

relief

In reversing the decision

Circuit Court

of Appeals

held

was adequately protected from

the existence

of a

$38,300.00 equity

of

the

cushion

(the difference between the first lien of $66,700.00 and

the

$105,000.00 market

its

ruling, the

value of

Ninth Circuit

the property).

Court clarified

In making
the

distinction

between equity and equity cushion:
"Equity cushion" has been defined as the value of the
property, above the amount owed to the creditor with a
secured claim, that will shield that interest from loss
due to any decrease in the value of the property during
the time the
automatic stay
remains in
effect.
"Equity," as opposed to "equity cushion", is the value,
above all secured claims against the property, that can
be realized from the sale of the property for the
benefit of the unsecured creditors.
Id. at 1400 n.2 (citations omitted).
In other words, the amount of an equity cushion is calculated
by taking the difference
issue, together with

between the amount

all other

of the lien

senior liens,

and the

at
fair

market value of the property securing such liens.
Turning to
found, based

the

on the

facts of

this

stipulation of

case, the

the parties,

value of the Property was $300,000.00.
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lower

court

that

the

(Findings of Fact No.

9, Record at 1485.)

The lower court additionally found

Brighton Bank was owed

$235,000.00 under the Brighton

(Findings of Fact No. 11, Record at 1485.)

that
Note.

The lower

court

made no finding regarding the existence of any liens superior
to the

Brighton

equity cushion

Trust
in the

Deed.
Property

Brighton Bank's senior lien
fair

market

$65,000.00.

value

Therefore,

of

Property

Accordingly, the
is protected

rather than

an $18,000.00

difference

($235,000.00) and the

the

the Property

is the

Brighton

between
appraised

($3 00,000.00)

interest of

by

Bank's

Brighton Bank

a $65,000.00

equity cushion

or

equity
as found

in

cushion
by

the

lower court.

II.
THE EXISTENCE OF A $65,000.00 EQUITY CUSHION IS
SUFFICIENT TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT BRIGHTON BANKfS LIEN
INTEREST AND A REINSTATEMENT OF THE SECTION 7-2-7 STAY
WILL NOT DEPRIVE BRIGHTON BANK OF THE VALUE
FOR WHICH IT BARGAINED.
Having established
protected by
asserts

that

a

the

Brighton

Trust

Deed

$65,000.00 equity

cushion,

Grant

Thornton

the

that

existence

of

sufficient to adequately protect
substantial period of
Section 7-2-7 stay

this

equity

is

cushion

is

Brighton Bank's lien for

time and that

a reinstatement of

will not financially

harm Brighton

a

the
Bank

nor deprive Brighton Bank of the value of its bargain.
It is beyond question that

under Utah law the

interest

of a senior lienholder takes precedence over and, indeed, may
16

even impinge upon the interests of junior lienholders.
Utah Code

Ann,

Sections 57-3-2,

57-1-29,

78-37-4

See,
(1953);

State v, Johnson, 268 P. 561 (Utah 1928) ; and Utah Farm Prod,
Credit v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904 (Utah 1987).
existence of junior

liens upon the

Thus,

the

Property, including

the

Copper State Trust Deed, can in no way impinge upon or impair
Brighton Bank's $65,000.00 equity cushion.
facts, the reinstatement

of the stay

Because of

these

of Section 7-2-7

will

not result in any financial injury to Brighton Bank.
The existence of

the $65,000.00

the obligation represented by
in value through

equity cushion

the Brighton Note to

the continual accrual

allows
increase

of interest, costs,

attorney fees and such other amounts as provided for therein.
As a result, Brighton Bank is entitled to eventually
every penny it

would otherwise receive

were presently made on the
Note were paid in full.
precludes

Brighton

remedies under the

interest

if monthly

payments

Brighton Note or if the

Brighton

While the Section 7-2-7 stay clearly

Bank

from

exercising

Brighton Trust Deed,

fully protects the value
accruing

and

receive

its

foreclosure

the equity

of Brighton Bank's lien,
costs.

Thus,

Brighton

cushion
including

Bank

will

eventually realize the full benefit of its bargain.
In contrast, the

lower court concluded

as a basis

for

its ruling that "the value of the property is being

consumed

by the ongoing interest charges of all the security

holders,
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but in

primary

part by

Entry, page 1; Record at

that

of Brighton

1302.)

Bank."

(Minute

In actuality, the

interest

accruing under the Brighton Note

is accruing at the rate

approximately $1,780.00 per month.

of

Accordingly, it will take

well over two (2) years before accruing interest will deplete
Brighton Bank's equity cushion, even taking into account some
$2 0,000.00 in presently
Grant Thornton

accrued costs

asserts that

reinstated, it will
Thornton to market

if the

and attorney's

Section 7-2-7

take substantially less
and sell

the Property

fees.

stay

time for

and pay

is

Grant

Brighton

Bank's lien in full.

III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF SECTION 7-2-7 IN THAT THE UTAH
LEGISLATURE EXPRESSLY INTENDED TO GRANT SPECIAL
PROTECTION TO THE DEPOSITORS OF A FAILED
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.
In opposition to Brighton Bank's motion for relief

from

stay, Grant Thornton argued before

the lower court that

the

stay should

order to

the

orderly

remain

liquidation

maximize the
Section

return

7-2-7

was

in effect
of

in

Copper

State's

to depositors,
enacted

for

and

assets
that the

as

to

stay

of
of

protecting the assets of a failed depository institution

for

to Motion

For Relief

However, in

its Minute

primary

so

purpose

the benefit of its depositors.

the

facilitate

(See Memorandum In Opposition

From Stay,

page 6,

Entry dated

18

Record at

January 27,

1115.)

1988, the

lower court was more persuaded by "the historical concerns of
priority [that] would

indicate that

should not be interfered with
even if that

Brighton Bank's

rights

by a junior lein-holder

lein-holder [sic]

is in a

[sic]

position of

having

come under the protection of a proceeding by the Commissioner
of Financial Institutions."

(Minute Entry, pages 2-3, Record

at 1303-4.)
On March

8, 1988,

Grant

lower court, inter alia, its

Thornton brought

before

Motion for Execution and

of Proposed Order, which order was the final Order

the

Entry

Modifying

Stay of Section 7-2-7(1), Utah Code Annotated, and from which
Grant Thornton appeals.

That hearing was

reported and

resulting transcript makes available for this Court's
further arguments by the parties relative to the
of Section
lower court

7-2-7 as
that

well as

will

review

application

additional statements

assist

this

Court

in

the

of

more

the

fully

understanding the lower court's perspective of the appliciton
of Section 7-2-7.
In response to

Grant Thornton's

7-2-7 was intended to

argument that

afford depositors special

Section

protection,

the lower court stated:
What you are dealing with are simply stockholders in a
failed corporation, a for-profit corporation, and while
I have sympathy with those people, I don't think I have
the right, and I don't think their rights should be any
better than anyone else's rights.
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(Transcript of Hearing on Grant Thornton's Motion
Execution and Entry of Proposed Order, March 8,
[hereinafter "Transcript"], page 40, Record at 1802.)

for
1988

The court further stated:
I donft think that the Legislature has said to the Court
that we've got to
protect the interests of
the
stockholders in these failed thrifts at the cost of the
stockholders or other creditors in other institutions
whose legal position was primary to start with. I just
don't think that's what the statute says. I don't think
the Legislature intended to give special rights to the
shareholders in the Thrifts, and I think in this case
that's all I'm
saying.
Frankly,
I don't
think
equitably, it's fair; if they did, I think it's very
infair [sic].
(Transcript, pages 32-33.)
In addition, the court opined:
I am just not of the view that simply because you have a
receiver for a bunch of people who had money in a
financial institution, that that financial institution's
agreement should, all of the sudden, become not binding
upon its receiver, and that steps into a better position
than anyone else would be if it were not in the hands of
receiver. I can't see the logical reason, the rightness
of it, nor the equity in allowing that to occur, simply
because the financial institution has failed and has
been taken over by a receiver; and yet, that's what you
would have urged me to do, which I denied.
(Transcript, page 18.)
In view of the

above statements, it

is clear that

lower court viewed the rights and interests of depositors

the
in

a failed financial institution to be no greater than those of
a

common

shareholder

corporation.
of a failed

or

creditor

of

a

failed

private

Thus, the lower court concluded that depositors
financial institution

special consideration or protection.
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are not

entitled to

any

However, the express provisions of
Code make it

clear that the

provide special

Title 7 of the

Utah

legislature indeed intended

protections to

the depositors

of a

to

failed

financial institution and to empower the receiver of a failed
institution with the

necessary statutory

the return to depositors
the failed

tools to

maximize

through the orderly liquidation

institution's assets.

and intent regarding the enactment

The legislative

of

findings

of Title 7 are set

forth

in Section 7-1-102, which states, in relevant part:
Accordingly, it is the further purpose of this title to
grant powers, privileges, and immunities to
state
chartered institutions at least equal to those possessed
by federally chartered or insured institutions of the
same class furnishing financial services to the people
of this State in order to promote competitive equality
in the financial services industry in this State to
protect the
interests
of
shareholders,
members,
depositors, and other customers of state chartered
institutions.
(b)
The legislature
further finds that
the
Commissioner of Financial Institution
. . .
has
recommended, in order
to protect the
depositors,
customers, and shareholders of depository institutions
. . ., that the Department of Financial Institutions be
empowered to regulate the establishment in this State
. . . and to restrict and regulate the acquisition of
the assets or control of depository institutions doing
business in this State.
(c)
The Legislature
further finds that
the
interest of the public will be served by especially
authorizing the acquisition of control of, the merger or
consolidation with, the acquisition of all or a portion
of the assets of, or the assumption of all or a portion
of the deposit and other liabilities of a failing or
failed Utah depository institution . . . approved by the
Commissioner or any receiver or liquidator appointed by
him.
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(d) It is> the intent of the Legislature that the
provisions of this title be interpreted and implemented
to promote those purposes, (Emphasis added.)
Clearly, Title 7

was enacted with

the specific and

express

purpose of protecting depositors of state-chartered financial
institutions.
In regard to the powers
of

Financial

Institutions,

and duties of the
Section

7-1-301

Commissioner
states,

in

relevant part:
In addition to the powers, duties and responsibilities
specified in this title, the Commissioner has all the
functions, powers and duties, and responsibilities which
respect to institutions, persons or businesses subject
to the jurisdiction of the department contained within
this article.
The Commissioner may adopt and issue
rules consistent with the purposes and provisions of
this title . . . [which are]:
(4) To safeguard the interest of shareholders,
members, depositors, and other customers of institutions
and other persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
department; (Emphasis added.)
Subseguent to the Commissioner's takeover of the various
failed thrifts

in 1986,

the

Utah Legislature,

session, enacted U.C.A. 7-20-1 entitled "Thrift
in Possession of

Commissioner" and

amended a number

of provisions to

in

Institutions

in connection
Title 7.

special

therewith

Section

7-20-1

states the legislative findings and declarations:
(1)

The Legislature finds and declares that:

(a) The economic well-being of the citizens
and communities of the state of Utah depends on the
stability and reliability of the financial institutions
in the state;
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(b)
Thrift institutions currently in the
possession of
the
commissioner
are
inadequately
capitalized to fully protect their depositors' funds;
(c) The industrial loan guaranty corporation
is in the possession of the commissioner and
is
inadequately funded to insure the deposits in member
thrift institutions;
(d)
The
public
trust
in
financial
institutions generally would be undermined if
the
commissioner were unable to maximize the return of
depositors from funds in the thrift institutions in the
possession of the commissioner; and
(e) Commerce in the state of Utah would be
adversely affected by the insolvencies of individual
depositors that may result from their inability to
maximize the return of their deposits from the thrift
institutions in the possession of the commissioner.
(2) It is, therefore, the purpose of this act to
facilitate
the
reorganization,
liquidation,
or
disposition of the assets of the thrift institutions in
possession of the commissioner _in order to maximize the
return of funds to depositors. (Emphasis added.)
The

above

statutory

legislative intent
depositors of

to

a failed

and

liquidation of

to
such

expresses

provide special

clear

to

to

the

preserve

institution for the benefit

provide
assets

the

protections

financial institution,

assets of a failed financial
depositors,

language

for
in

the

orderly

furtherance

of

and

of

timely

the

prime

directive to maximize the return of funds to depositors.
It is equally
Chapter 2 of Title

evident from the
7 that this

foremost to protect depositors.

legislative history

legislation seeks first
During the 198 3

including

the enactment
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of

the stay

and

legislative

session, the Utah Legislature made substantial amendments
Title 7,

to

of

to

Section

7-2-7.

Recorded statements from the Senate Floor Debate make

it clear that the amendments to Title 7 were made in order to
strengthen

the

Commissioner's

ability

to

deal

financially-troubled institutions and to increase the
of depositors.

In the

proposed amendments to

introductory remarks
Title 7, Senator

with
rights

regarding

the

Karl Snowr made

the

following comments:
It is particularly important in my view that the
Department and
the
Commissioner
particularly
be
empowered to
take supervisory
action to
protect
depositors and other creditors of troubled financial
institutions. . . . Now, if I could emphasize and point
out to the members of the Body that under current
statutes depositors are treated as unsecured creditors
entitled to absolutely no preferences or priority over
any other creditor. Now I think all of you would agree
with me that this is not sound public policy to allow
depositors to assume a risk that they are no equipped to
assess independently.
If the
public is to
have
confidence in the soundness and safety of
Utah's
financial institutions, depositors must, in my view, be
given priority over other creditors.
The current law
provides that the
only remedy
available to
the
Commissioner is a take-over of problem institutions, and
again I emphasize that depositors have no priority of
position. The supervisory powers or responsibilities of
the Commissioner must be expanded and of course that is
the intent of this legislation, to prevent losses to the
public in any takeover. . . . This bill seeks first and
foremost to protect depositors.
(Senate Floor Debate on Senate Bill 238 of The Financial
Institution's Act Amendment, February 28, 1983
(emphasis
added) [hereinafter "Senate Floor Debate"][Statement
of
Senator Karl Snow].)
Elaine

Weiss,

Institutions, stated

then

the

Commissioner

the following

enacting Senate Bill 238:
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of

regarding the

Financial
need

for

I think another needed change was to give depositors
priority. We found out in the very first thrift case
that depositors were treated as unsecured creditors. I
don't feel this is sound public policy and after
discussing with a number of the legislators, it was my
opinion that it was not the legislative intent. What we
have done is to give the depositors priority so even in
a possession case depositors can have access to at least
part of his funds. The hardship that was worked on the
public, the depositors of the very first thrift case,
was very great and should there be another situation
where the State is forced to take possession, we do not
think that the depositors should be the victims, the
depositors should pay the price, and they paid the price
in Murray.
Representative Jepson added:
I would surely support this bill. . . .
It will protect
the consumer and their banking deposits also relating to
checking accounts, putting them in line of assets,
distribution of assets, and they would be a preference
depositor.
Representative

Hillyard

also

made

the

following

comment

regarding the priority to be given depositors:
For example, this bill would give the depositor the
first lien on those assets. Now it's not the case. And
you know, the State of Utah is one of the principal
depositors in our local institutions. If our doors were
to go bankruptcy [sic] or into receivership without some
change in the law, we would be an unsecured creditors
for whatever may be left of the assets. . . .
Finally, in mustering support for the passage of
Bill 238, Representative

Hillyard summarized

the

Senate

bill

as

follows:
I urge your support for this Senate bill. I realize
it's a complicated piece of legislation and it has been
in an area that is very complicated for many people to
understand . . .
it is one that is designated to give
the Commissioner
greater power
to implement
the
authority intent
of
Senate Bill
138
[Financial
Institutions Act of 1981] and it is one that is the best
for the interest of the State of Utah for all people who
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have deposits in our financial institutions to give them
the protection they really need . . .
When read in light
and history, it

of the legislative findings,

becomes clear

enacted to both provide

that Title 7,

ordinary creditors and

return

liquidation

from

the

institution's assets.
the Utah Legislature

In

depositors

dissipating

by

such

enacted the

assets.

7-2-71) (1987) and
7-2-7 in order to
protecting the

that

Modifying

a

goals,

Section 7-2-7

third-party
Accordingly,

this

Stay

Court

of Utah

promote the intent
of

Copper

the

financial

effectuate these

reverse
Code

from

Thornton
the

lower

Ann.,

Section

stay of

Section

of the legislature

State

to

benefit

creditors
Grant

reinstate the automatic

assets

to maximize
failed

stay of

was

protections

failed institution for the

precluding

respectfully requests
court's Order

of

order to

preserve all assets of a
of

Chapter 2

depositors with greater

than those afforded

intent

for

the

by

ultimate

benefit of its depositors.

IV.
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT TO GRANT
BRIGHTON BANK'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
THE SECTION 7-2-7 STAY WILL INJURE
COPPER STATE'S DEPOSITORS.
Prior

to

Brighton

Bank's

motion

for

relief,

Thornton had commenced to market the Property through a
estate agent and multiple listing service.
of

the

stay

of

Section

7-2-7,
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Grant

With the
Thornton

Grant
real

benefit
had

the

opportunity to

market

the Property

within

a

commercially

reasonable amount of time and thus maximize the ultimate sale
price of the Property.

The stay also precluded Brighton Bank

from forcing Grant Thornton to use Copper State's meager cash
assets to

make monthly

payments

under the

Brighton

Note.

Once the Property was sold, Grant Thornton would pay Brighton
Bank in

full and

proceeds

for

retain Copper

later

State's share

distribution

to

of the

depositors.

sale

Such

a

disposal of the Property under the aegis of the Section 7-2-7
stay insured that Brighton Bank would not lose the benefit of
its bargain

at the

time of

recover the unpaid principal
Note together with

the sale

(Brighton Bank

balance due under the

all accrued interest

depositors of Copper State could

would

Brighton

and costs) and

the

reap the benefit of one

of

the few viable assets belonging to the thrift.
As a result of the

lower court's order granting

from the stay, the optimum
longer possible and

cash assets of Copper
Note.

First,

with only

assets to

can

or pay-off the

Grant Thornton can spend

State's meager

junior interest.

is faced

Grant Thornton

State to buy

In other words,

of Copper

outcome as explained above is

Grant Thornton

unacceptable scenarios.

relief

protect its

no
two

expend

Brighton

$235,000.00
$47,000.00

If this were an isolated case, this may

an acceptable alternative.
significant portion

of

However, given the

Copper
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State's

assets

be

fact that

a

consist

of

junior lien

interests,

Grant Thornton

believes

could become a financially impossible option.
Thornton

can

allow

Brighton

Bank

to

that

this

Second,

proceed

Grant

with

its

foreclosure of the Property under the Brighton Trust Deed

in

hopes of a bid in excess of the amount owed Brighton Bank.
As a practical matter, excess proceeds are unlikely
at least the following
almost never

pay

trustee's deed

reasons:

fair market

sale;

(2)

(1)

interested

value

for a

Brighton

purchasers

property

Bank's

for

at

interests

parochial in that it has no motivation to maximize the

a

are
sales

price of the Property; and (3) the nature of the Property

is

such that it is unlikely that active bidding will be made

on

the Property.

The most likely outcome is that Brighton

Bank

will purchase the Property at trustee's sale through a credit
bid of its lien.

This will extinguish Copper State's

junior

lien interest and result in no return to depositors.
Grant

Thornton

asserts

specifically intended to
scenario described
7-2-7, and that

that

the

preclude the

above through

Utah

Legislature

occurrence of

the enactment

Grant Thornton's marketing

of

of the

within a commercially reasonable time is in complete
with the overall purpose

and intent of

either
Section
Property
harmony

Title 1, Chapter

2.

By reversing the lower court and reinacting the Section 7-2-7
stay, this Court

will protect

the interests

of all

Copper

State's depositors and cause no injury to Brighton E*ank.
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The

equity cushion

protects Brighton

Bank when

Grant

Thornton

sells the Property.
Even if Grant Thornton cannot sell the Property for
current

value

of

$300,000.00

Brighton Note continues

or

if

to erode the

dollar above Brighton Bank's lien

interest

its

under

equity cushion,

the
every

that can be realized

from

Grant Thornton's sale of the Property will be one more dollar
for the benefit of Copper State's depositors; whereas,
on the decision of the

based

lower court, the depositors now

will

realize nothing from Copper State's lien on the Property.

V.
CONTRARY TO THE LOWER COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW,
SECTION 7-2-7 SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
IN LIGHT OF FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY LAW.
In opposition

to

Grant Thornton argued
Court decisions
Chapter 2, the

Brighton Bank's
that in

interpreting

motion

the absence
the

lower court should

for

relief,

of Utah

Supreme

provisions

of

Title

look to bankruptcy

7,

court

decisions interpreting the analogous automatic stay provision
of the

United States

Opposition to

Bankruptcy Code.

Motion For

pages 5-10; Record at

1114-20.)

reliance upon bankruptcy
well-developed body

of

liquidation of assets
bankruptcy

courts.

Relief From

(See Memorandum
Stay of

law concerning
is found in

Grant

the

also

that

since the

most

protection

and

the decisions of

Thornton

29

Proceedings,

Grant Thornton argued

law is appropriate

in

noted

federal

that

the

language of

Section

7-2-7

is virtually

identical

to

the

Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. Section
3 62.

Grant

Thornton

reasoned

that

the

Utah

Legislature

adopted language from the Bankruptcy Code with the intent
providing

depositors

with

creditors in a bankruptcy
assets for

the benefit

Thornton also

the

same

protections

afforded

case; namely, the preservation
of depositors.

asserts that

the logic

In addition,
and policy

of

of

Grant

arguments

behind federal bankruptcy law supports Grant Thornton's prior
arguments that (1)

Brighton Bank's

lien is

protected by

a

$65,000.00 equity cushion; (2) Brighton Bank was not and will
not be financially damaged as a

result of the stay; and

(3)

the termination of the stay was not in the best interests

of

Copper State's

an

depositors, and,

indeed, will

result in

injury to such depositors.
In

ruling

against

Grant

Thornton,

the

lower

court

determined that:
The Utah Legislature, in enacting the provisions of
Title 7, Chapter 2, did not intend to adopt federal
bankruptcy law, nor the cases thereunder, as governing
law for the courts of the State of Utah.
(Conclusions of Law No. 1, Record at 1486.)
The court additionally ruled thcit:
The apparent minority rule, adopted by the Bankruptcy
Court for the State of Utah, which would allow a junior
lienholder under the protection of a proceeding by the
Commissioner of Financial Institutions to interfere with
a prior
lienholder's
immediate
rights
to
seek
foreclosure, should not govern herein.
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(Conclusions of Law No. 2, Record at 1486.)
In the hearing on March 8, 1988, the court went so far as

to

state:
. . . [Y]oufve got to convince me that the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah is going to say that what I think
to be a minority rule in the bankruptcy area, as adopted
by the Utah Bankruptcy Court, and frankly, a rule, which
in part I think turns on what I regard to be a very
flawed piece of Federal law, that's the whole Bankruptcy
Act, should become the law of this State in relation to
these issues.
(Transcript, page 18.)
While Grant Thornton cannot cite, for the benefit of the
Court,

express

legislative

references

history

to

to

bankruptcy

Section

7-2-7,

nonetheless urges this Court
1-2-1

in

a

manner

law

in

Grant

Thornton

to interpret and apply

consistent

interpreting the automatic stay

with

the

Section

federal

decisions

provision of the

Bankruptcy

Code.

1.

The Utah Legislature Patterned Many Of The Sections
Of Title 7 Chapter 2, Including
Section
1-2-1,
After Provisions Contained In The United States
Bankruptcy Code.

The clearest example of the Utah Legislature's

adoption

of statutory language from the United States Bankruptcy

Code

is found in Section 7-2-7(1), which is taken almost

verbatim

from 11 U.S.C., Section 362(a), the automatic stay

provision

of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
relevant part:
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Section 362 states

in

(a) Except as provided in subsection b of this section,
a petition filed under . . . this title . . . operates
as a stay . . . o f —
(1) The commencement of
. . ., including the
issuance or employment of process, of a judicial,
administrative, or other action of proceeding against
the debtor . . .;
(2) The enforcement . . . of a judgment obtained
before the commencement of a case under this title;
(3) Any act to obtain possession of property of
the estate or of property from the estate . . .;
(4) Any act to create, perfect, or enforce any
lien against property of the estate;
(6) Any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim
against the debtor . . .;
(7) The setoff of any debt owing to the debtor . .
. against any claim against the debtor.
(d) On request of a party in interest and after
notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from
the stay . . . such as by terminating, annulling,
modifying, or conditioning such stay . . . for cause . .
In comparison, the statutory

language of Section

7-2-7

is as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise specified in subsection
(2), the taking of an institution or other person by the
Commissioner under this Chapter shall operate cts a stay
of the commencement or continuation of:
(a)
A
judicial,
administrative,
or
other
proceeding against the institution, including service of
process;
(b)
Enforcement of any judgment against
the
institution;
(c) Any act to obtain possession of property of or
from the institution;
(d) Any act to create, perfect, or enforce any
lien against property of the institution;
(e) Any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim
against the institution; and
(f)
The setoff
of any debt
owing to
the
institution against any crime against the institution.
Upon application and after notice and hearing, the court
may for cause shown, terminate, annul, modify, or
condition the stay.
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This comparison of
3 62 evidences

a

Section 7-2-7 to

clear intent

pattern Section 7-2-7 after

109(b)(2), a financial
debtor under
7-2-7

the

to

the automatic stay provision

of

institutions

Code.

similar

Code.

state-chartered

protection

Section

eligible to be

Bankruptcy

provides

with

Under 11 U.S.C.

institution is not

United States

therefore

the Utah

Section

Legislature

the United States Bankruptcy

by

11 U.S.C.

a

Section
financial

available

to

other

insolvent entities under the United States Bankruptcy Code.
It should

be

noted that

the

language of

11

U.S.C.,

Section 362(d) states that the court shall grant relief
the stay if

good cause

exists, while

that the court may grant relief
is shown.

The granting

Section 7-2-7
Legislature

to

institution for
court to

protect

cause

judicial discretion

under

a clear

assets

the benefit

determine whether

states

from the stay if good

of full

again evidences

Section 7-2-7

from

intent by

of

a

failed

of depositors
the stay

annulled, modified, or conditioned,

the

Utah

financial

by allowing

should be

the

terminated,

even if good cause

does

exist for granting such relief.
It must be further noted
allows

the

automatic

bankruptcy

stay

for

court

cause,

that 11 U.S.C. Section
to

grant

including

relief
lack

of

protection or lack of equity in the property if the
is not necessary

to the

debtor's effective
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3 62(d)

from

the

adequate
property

reorganization.

In comparison, Section 7-2-7 contains no specific grounds for
relief.

Grant

Thornton asserts

that

the stay

of

Section

7-2-7 is a sword to protect the cissets of a failed thrift for
the benefit of depositors; however, Section 7-2-7 provides no
shield for creditors, and no specific grounds for relief from
the stay.

Therefore,

based

on

the

absence

of

language

mandating relief from the stay and in the absence of specific
grounds constituting

good cause

for relief

from the

stay,

Grant Thornton asserts that the Utah Legislature intended the
stay of Section 7-2-7 to
by providing an

be weighted in favor of

even broader grant

contained in 11 U.S.C. Section
may even allow

the stay to

lienholder is

not adequately

equity in

the

property,

of protection than

that

3 62 and that the state

court

remain in place

where a

protected, where

and

depositors

where

the

senior

there is

property

is

no
not

necessary for a reorganization of the thrift.
In addition to Section 7-2-7, Chapter 2 is replete
provisions which were

adopted either directly

concept from sections of

the Bankrutpcy Code.

with

or by way
A

of

comparison

of similar Bankruptcy Code provisions contained in Chapter
are as follows:
Title 7, Chapter 2

United States Bankruptcy Code

Section 7-2-12(4)

11 U.S.C. Section 365(g)

Section 7-2-12(6)(b)

11 U.S.C. Section 544(a)(3)

Section 7-2-12(6)(c)

11 U.S.C. Section 544(a)(1)
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2

Section 7-2-12(6]1(d)

11 U.S.C. Section 544(a)

Section 7-2-12(6]1(e)

11 U.S.C. Section 101(50)

Section 7-2-12(6]>(f)

11 U.S.C. Section 547(b)

Section 7-2-12(6]1(f) (i)

11 U.S.C. Section 547(f)

Section 7-2-12(6]1(f) (ii)

11 U.S.C. Section 547(e)(1)(A)

Section 7-2-12(6]l(f)( iii)

11 U.S.C. Section 547(e)(1)(B)

Section 7-2-15(1]I (b)

11 U.S.C. Section 507(a)(1)

Section 7-2-15(1]1(C)

11 U.S.C. Section 507(a)(3)

Section 7-2-15(1])(e)

11 U.S.C. Section 506(C)

Section 7-2-15(1]1(e)

11 U.S.C. Section 502(b)(6)

Section 7-2-18(3]

11 U.S.C. Section 1141(a)

Section 7-2-18(4]

Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a)

Based on

the

substantial

incorporation

in

Title

7,

Chapter 2 of Bankruptcy Code provisions, it is clear that the
drafters of Chapter 2 intended

to employ the procedures

protections of

Code in

financial

the Bankruptcy

institutions

and

in

dealing with

maximizing

the

depositors through the preservation and ultimate
of financial institution assets.
of other controlling

failed

return

to

liquidation

Therefore, in the

case law, Grant

and

absence

Thornton asserts

that

judicial reference to federal bankruptcy law interpreting the
substantially

similar

automatic

stay

provision

of

the

Bankruptcy Code is appropriate in this case.

2.

The Express Legislative Intent Underlying
The
Automatic Stay Provision Of The United States
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Bankruptcy Code Is Directly
Of Section 7-2-7.
The express
7-2-7, is directly
Bankruptcy Code's

Legislative

Analogous To The

purpose

analogous to the
automatic stay

in

enacting

Section

purpose underlying

provision.

Code aids in the

the

Therefore,

understanding of the underlying policy of the automatic
provision of the Bankruptcy

Stay

an

stay

interpretation

and application of Section 7-2-7.
A review of

the legislative history

to Section 3 62

of

the United States Bankruptcy Code is helpful in understanding
the scope and purpose of the stay.
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor
protections provided by the bankruptcy law. . . .
The
automatic
stay
also
provides
creditor
protection. Without it, certain creditors would be able
to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's
property. Those who acted first would obtain payment of
the claims in preference to and to the detriment of
other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an
orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors
are to be treated equally.
A race of diligence by
creditors for the debtor's assets prevents that. . . .
. . . .

The purpose of this provision is to
dismemberment of the estate. Liquidation must
in an orderly fashion.

prevent
proceed

. . . .

The paragraph in (7) stays setoffs of mutual debts
and credits between the debtor and creditor. As with
all other paragraphs of subsection (a), this paragraph
does not affect the right of creditors. It simply stays
its enforcement pending an orderly examination of the
debtor's and creditor's rights.
(House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340-2 (1977);
Senate Report No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51 (1978).)
Since the assets of the debtor are in the possession and
control of the bankruptcy
court, and since
they
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constitute a fund out of which all creditors are
entitled to share, enforcement by a governmental unit
[or other creditor] of a money judgment would give it
preferential treatment to the detriment of all other
creditors•
(House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong,, 1st Sess. 342-3 (1977);
Senate Report No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-2 (1978).)
In addition, one of
the

Bankruptcy

Code

the most respected commentaries

has

made

the

following

on

statement

regarding the scope of the stay.
The stay of Section 3 62 is extremely broad in scope and
. . . should apply to almost any type of formal or
informal action against the debtor or the property of
the estate.
It should be observed that one of the
benefits of the stay is creditor protection in a manner
consistent with the promotion in the bankruptcy goal of
equality of distribution.
Collier on Bankruptcy, paragraph 362.04
1988) .

at 362-31 (15th

ed.

Based on the above legislative history and comments, the
purpose of the automatic stay
summarized as follows:

(1)

of the Bankruptcy Code may
To

provide the

be

debtor with

a

breathing spell from creditors in order to analyze the extent
of assets

and the

validity

equality of distribution of
to promote

an

orderly

of claims;

(2) to

promote

assets among creditors; and

administration

and,

if

an
(3)

necesasry,

liquidation of estate assets.
Grant

Thornton

asserts

conclusion resulting from
purpose

underlying

Bankruptcy Code,

the

that

the

only

the comparison of
automatic

the express

stay

the policy

provision

legislative intent
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reasonable

of

and
the

supporting

Title 7, Chapter 2 and the language of Section 7-2-7, is that
the purpose of

Section 7-2-7

and 11 U.S.S.

Section 362

is

identical.

VI.
IN VIEW OF SECTION 7-2-7'S NEXIS WITH THE UNITED
STATE'S BANKRUPTCY CODE, IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT IT BE
INTERPRETED EITHER DIRECTLY OR BY REFERENCE TO
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY CASE LAW.
In its argument in opposition to Brighton Bank's
for relief from
argued

that

the stay

federal

of Section

bankruptcy

7-2-7, Grant

law,

either

reference or by analogy, should be considered in
the scope of

the stay

and the grounds

motion
Thornton

by

direct

determining

for granting

relief

from the stay.
In its

Reply

Memorandum,

Brighton

Bank

argued

that

federal bankruptcy law was of minimal precedential value

and

that the absence of

for

enumerated factors justifying cause

relief from the Section 7-2-7 evidences an intent by the Utah
Legislature

to

provide

discretion

than

that

the

state

possessed

deciding whether good cause

by

courts

with

bankruptcy

greater
courts

exists for granting relief

in
from

the stay.
Grant

Thornton

bankruptcy law

is

asserts

that

appropriate for

reference
the

to

federal

following

reasons.

First, the decisions of the federal bankruptcy courts provide
a complete, sophisticated and carefully reasoned body of
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law

concerning the

protection and

liquidation of

assets of

an

insolvent entity and the maximization of payment to creditors
of such

an

entity.

Inasmuch

as

the

interpretation

and

application of Section 7-2-7 is an issue of first impression,
this

Court

should

avail

principals, policy

itself

of

and procedures

the

well-established

employed by

the

bankruptcy courts in interpreting and applying the

federal

analagous

automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code.
In addition, Grant Thornton
that federal

bankruptcy law

instance but

has

has not taken the

should be

rather asserted

of

well-reasoned decisions

of

federal bankruptcy law

are helpful
light

of

interests employed in the relief

in the

this

absence

law, the

in

controlling in

that

controlling state case

7-2-7, especially

position

in interpreting

the

similar

Section

balancing

from stay decisions of

of
the

federal bankruptcy courts.
Grant Thornton asserts that

its application of

Section

7-2-7 is in harmony with current federal bankruptcy law.
determining whether relief from

stay should be granted,

In
the

Bankruptcy Code mandates that the court balance the interests
to be protected —
benefit of

the interest in preserving assets for

all creditors

secured creditor to

balanced against

execute on the

debt.
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the right

collateral securing

the

of

a

its

In balancing
employs

the

these

concept

interests, federal

of

essence, requires that

"adequate

bankruptcy

protection"

while a secured

which,

in

creditor may not

be

able to immediately execute on its lien, adequate
of the lien is required in
creditor receives

the

protection

order to ensure that the

value

for which

law

it

secured

bargained.

As

stated in Collier:
The most important message of the Code with respect
to the treatment of entities with an interest in
property of the estate is that their remedies may
be suspended, even abrogated, their right
of
recourse to collateral may be terminated as it is
consumed in the business, but the value of their
secured position as it existed at the commencement
of the case is to be protected throughout the case
[by means of adequate p r o t e c t i o n ] . . . .
Collier on Bankruptcy, paragraph

361.01 at

361-7 (15th

ed.

1988) .
In this case, the secured

interest of Brighton Bank

is

being adequately protected through the existence of an equity
cushion of approximately $65,000.00.
cushion, Brighton Bank's secured
in

amount

through

attorneys1 fees.

the

accrual

While

interest under the

it

Because of this

lien continues to
of

is true

Brighton Note will

equity
increase

interest,

costs,

and

that

accrual

of

the

eventually erode

the

net equity of the Property and will thereafter begin to erode
the value of Copper

State's lien, it

will be a

substantial

period of time before Brighton Bank experiences any damage as
a result

of being

stayed

from exercising
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its

foreclosure

rights under the

Brighton Trust Deed.

In other words,

the

stay of Section 7-2-7 would impair Brighton Bank's ability to
exercise its foreclosure remedies; however, Brighton Bank

is

not being financially

is

sufficient equity

damaged by the

cushion

in

the

stay because there

Property

to

cover

its

recognized

the

absence of injury to a senior

lienholder as a result of

the

automatic

is

the

accruing interest, costs, or attorneys' fees.
The

Ninth

stay

Circuit

where

Court

there

of

property to cover accruing interest
of In re Mellor, supra,

Appeals

sufficient

value

and costs.

the Ninth Circuit

in

In the

Court of

Appeals

held:
Although the existence of a junior lien may be
relevant in determining "equity" under section
362(d)(2), it cannot be considered in determining
whether the interest of a senior lienholder is
adequately
protected.
In re La Jolla Mortgage
Fund, 18 B.R. at 289. The claim of a junior
lienholder cannot affect the claim of a holder of a
perfected senior
interest.
See
In re Wolford
Enterprises, Inc.,
11
B.R.
571,
574
(B.Ct.S.D.W.Virg. 1981) [rejecting contention that
defendant lacked equity due to second deed of
trust; creditor failed to acknowledge that first
deed has priority and that value of property was
sufficient to satisfy that lien]; In re Breuer, 4
B.R. 499 (B.Ct.S.D.N.Y. 1980) [holding there was a
sufficient equity cushion for creditor holding
first mortgage despite existence of four junior
mortgages totalling more than market value of
property].
Thus, in determining that adequate
protection was not available . . ., the bankruptcy
court failed to recognize that the [senior lien]
interest has priority over [the junior
lien]
interest. It also has priority over all of the
judgment liens.
Id. at 1400-01.
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case

In addition,

the

Ninth

Circuit Court

held

that

superior lienholder was attempting to acquire property
substantially more

than its

senior lien:

worth

"The purpose

adequate protection under section 3 61

is to ensure that

secured

essentially

creditor

bargained for,

not

receives
a

in

value

windfall.11

Id.

the

at

of
the

what

1401

he

(citation

omitted).
The Bankruptcy

Court

for

the

likewise recognized that senior
by

the

stay

of

11

U.S.C.

District

Section

In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.,

for relief

from stay

Utah

lienholders are not
3 62

where

sufficient collateral to protect their lien.

1981), Judge Mabey ruled

of

12

B.R.

803

warranted for

damaged
there

is

In the case

of

(Bktcy.

that a senior lienholder's

was not

has

the

Utah

request
following

reasons:
It is a first lien with ample collateral to protect
Banker's Life.
The collateral and therefore the
lien are not declining or subject to
sudden
depreciation in value. Banker's Life is suffering
no pain cognizable under section 3 62 as a result of
the stay, and relief from the stay is therefore, at
this juncture, unnecessary.
Id. at 809.
Judge Mabey

further recognized

that

relief from

the

stay

under such circumstances would not be in the best interest of
creditors:
Foreclosure and liquidation of the property would
run counter to [the debtor's reorganization] and
would deprive debtor and other creditors of its
going-concern value. If liquidation is allowed, it
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should occur under the aegis of the Court and in
the interests of all.
Banker's Life is no better
qualified to handle this liquidation than the
debtor or the trustee.
Indeed, Banker's Life may
be ill-equipped to undertake this task,
both
because its interests are parochial and because,
for regulatory or other reasons, it may be a
reluctant caretaker.
Id.
Judge Mabey concluded that the interests of all creditors are
better served
rather than

if
in

property is

a forced

sold

in an

orderly

due

to the

fact

sale

commercial marketing of real

fashion
that

property almost always

in a higher sale price than if the real property is

the

results
disposed

of through a trust deed or foreclosure sale.
For these
preclude

reasons, the

Brighton

Bank

stay

from

remedies under the Brighton

of Section

exercising

7-2-7

the

should

foreclosure

Trust Deed because its

superior

lien interest is adequately protected by a significant equity
cushion to

cover

attorneys' fees.
and in

the

Thornton has

continually-accruing interest,
In

support of

absence of
cited

Grant Thornton's

controlling

state case

federal bankruptcy

recognizes that the

costs

interests of all

law

and

argument,
law,

which

Grant

likewise

creditors, or in

this

case the interests of depositors, must be weighed against the
interests of

secured creditors;

lienholder is not

however, where

being financially damaged

the stay of Section 7-2-7,

a

as a result

the stay should remain in
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superior
of

effect

in order to preserve and maximize the value of assets for the
benefit of depositors.

CONCLUSION
In view of the express provisions of Title 7, Chapter
as well as its
it is clear

supporting legislative findings and

that the

Utah Legislature

depositors of a failed

institution

Utah.

chartered

Legislature intended

in
to

preserve

history,

intended to

special protections to the

Specifically,
the assets

2

provide
financial

the

of

a

Utah
failed

institution for the benefit of depositors and to provide

for

the orderly and timely liquidation of such assets in order to
maximize the return

to such depositors.

The lower

court's

decision, however, frustrates the purpose of this legislation
and deprives the depositors of Copper State of the

statutory

protections to which they are entitled.
Moreover, the competing interests of Brighton Bank as
senior lienholder

in

the

Property are

enforcement of the stay under

not

threatened

Section 7-2-7 in light of

$65,000 equity cushion adequately protecting its interest.
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a
by

the

For the foregoing
requests this

Court

reasons, Grant Thornton
to

reverse

the

lower

respectfully
court's

Modifying Stay of Section 7-2-7(1), Utah Code Annotated.
DATED this / ^ day of June, 1988.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

raig H. Christensen
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS
Attorneys for Appellant
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day of June, 1988,
I hereby certify that on the
four copies of the foregoing documen& were hand-delivered to
Steve R. Gunn, Esq., RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 4 00 Deseret
Building, 79 South Main Street^Salt Lake City, Utah 84145.
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FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE
Salt Lake County Lftsh

n '938

MMR

H D<xon H.na!ev,Clesk 3rd a s * Court

Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq. (1741)
Laura Me Harris, Esq. (4332)
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS
Attorneys for Grant Thornton & Co,
Liquidator/Receiver
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8400

(\DeootV Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE POSSESSION
BY THE COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS OF COPPER STATE
THRIFT Sc LOAN COMPANY

Case No. C-87-58

ORDER MODIFYING STAY OF SECTION 7-2-7(1),
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
The Motion for Relief from the Stay of Proceedings filed
by Brighton Bank

came on

for hearing

Richard H. Moffatt on December 18,
a.m.

before the

Honorable

1987 at the hour of

9:00

Grant Thornton, the Receiver/Liquidator of Copper State

Thrift Sc Loan was
Jones of

Allen

represented by

Nelson Hardy

&

its counsel,
Evans.

Jeffrey

Brighton

M.

Bank

was

represented by its counsel, Steven H. Gunn of Ray, Quinney
Nebeker.

The Court heard the

oral argument of the

parties,

reviewed the memoranda of the parties concerning the
and took the matter
oral arguments
Entry on

under advisement.

and memoranda,

January

27, 1988

and

the

As

motion,

a result of

Court filed

now desires

to

&

its

said
Minute

enter

its

findings of fact, conclusions of law and order as follows:

1

(><JJU&3

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Copper

State is

executed by Willis and

the holder

of a

Promissory

Afton Wright (hereinafter

"Wrights")

on or about March 29, 1983.

This Note was secured by a

of Trust

1983

located

dated
at

March

2500

29,

Walker

Lane,

describing

real

Salt

County,

Lake

Note

Deed

property
Utah

(hereinafter the "Property").
2-

On or about September

12, 1983, Wrights executed

Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed in favor of Brighton Bank

a
for

the Property.
3.

On or about October 11, 1983, Copper State agreed to

subordinate the Copper

State Deed

of Trust to

the Deed

of

Trust executed by the Wrights in favor of Brighton Bank.
4.

The

Wrights

defaulted

on

their

obligations

Brighton Bank and Copper State and on or about May 30,

to

198 6,

Brighton Bank served on the Wrights and recorded a Notice

of

Default in preparation for a non-judicial foreclosure of

the

Property.
5.

On

or

Brighton Bank's
filed a

petition

about September
foreclosure
in

26,

of the

bankruptcy

1986, in

response

Property,

under

the

Chapter

7

to

Wrights
of

the

Bankruptcy Code.
6.

By

Order dated

obtained relief

from

September

the

7, 1987,

Automatic Stay

2

in

Brighton
the

Bank

Wright's

bankruptcy proceeding

to

permit

it

to

proceed

with

its

non-judicial foreclosure.
7.

On or about September 22, 1987, the Bankruptcy Court

granted relief from the Automatic Stay in Wrights' bankruptcy
to permit Copper

State to

proceed with

foreclosure on

its

lien on the Property.
8.

On November

18, 1987,

Copper State

Wrights and recorded in

the office of

Lake County,

Utah,

State

of

as

served on

the

the recorder of

part

of

a

Salt

non-judicial

foreclosure of the Property, a Notice of Default.
9.

The value of the Property is Three Hundred

Dollars ($300,000.00) as shown
dated June 11,
10.

by Brighton Bank's

Thousand
appraisal

1987.

Brighton Bank is

currently owed approximately

Two

Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Dollars ($235,000.00) and Copper
State

is

owed

($47,000.00).
Copper State

approximately

Together,
total

the

Forty

claims of

approximately

Seven

Thousand
Bank

and

Eighty

Two

in value because of

its

Two

Brighton
Hundred

Thousand Dollars ($287,000.00).
11.

The Property is declining

age, its lack

of occupancy,

a general decline

in the

real

estate market, and other factors.
12.

The

value of

the Property

is being

consumed

ongoing interest accruing on the obligations of Copper

by

State

and Brighton Bank, and by other claims against the Property.
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13.

There

is

interest will not

no

evidence

that

continue to accrue

would

suggest

and continue to

that
erode

the equity cushion.
14.

Considering only

the claims of

Brighton Bank

and

Copper State, which together total $282,000.00, and the value
of the Property

at $300,000.00, there

is only a

$18,000.00

"equity cushion".
15.

This $18,000.00 cushion will probably be more

absorbed by known

but unascertained

than

costs, attorney's

fees

and other claims.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
Title

The Utah Legislature, in enacting the provisions
7,

Chapter

2,

did

not

intend

to

adopt

of

federal

bankruptcy law nor the cases thereunder as governing law

for

the courts of the State of Utah.
2.

The

apparent

minority

Bankruptcy Court for the State

rule,

adopted

by

the

of Utah, which would allow

a

junior lienholder under the protection of a proceeding by the
Commissioner of Financial
prior lienholder's

Institutions to

immediate

rights

to

interfere with
seek

a

foreclosure,

should not govern herein.
3.
and the

Because of the decline in the value of the

Property

accruing interest

applying

of Brighton

Bank, even

federal bankruptcy law, there is sufficient "cause" to

4

allow

Brighton Bank to exercise

its rights to foreclosure

against

the Property,
Therefore, having now entered its findings of facts
conclusions of law,

the Court

hereby orders

that the

and
stay

imposed by Section 7-2-7 of the Utah Code Annotated be and is
hereby lifted

so

that

Brighton Bank

and

all

other

lien

claimants may proceed cjgainct the Property.
The Court further certifies that

this Order is a

final

order under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this

day of £eb*rtrary, 1988.

ATTEST

:-* DIXON HINDLEY
^

BY

-TheN
District/ C

CLERK

Richard Moffatt
Judge

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY

?6

I hereby certify that on the
day of February,
1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
hand-delivered to Steven Gunn of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 79
South Main, #400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SAIT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE POSSESSION
BY THF CC^TSSIONER OF FINANCIAL
INSTTIUTTONS OF COPPER STATE
THRIFT AND IJ3AN COMPANY

:

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. C-87-58

The Motion for Relief from the Stay of Proceedings filed by Brighton
Bank having been heard on oral argument and multiple memoranda having been
submitted and considered, the Court now decides as follows. The Court is of
the opinion that the Stay as to the action of Brighton Bank, in foreclosing
its Trust Deed Lain should be lifted. This decision is based upon the fact
that there is a declining value in the property by reason of its age, its
not being occupied, and other factors including a general decline in the
real estate market. That is demonstrated by a comparison of the two
appraisals heretofore made on the property.

In addition, the value of the

property is being consumed by the ongoing interest charges of all of the
security holders but in prjjrary part by that of Brighton Bank.

Brighton

Bankfs interest in the property now is in the magnitude of $2:35,000 and
increasing daily because of the large amount of the principle debt due to
that institution. The other claims against the property are likewise
increasing with the passage of time. There is no evidence before the Court
that situation is likely to end in the near future under the present status
of affairs.

PAGE TOO
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At this point, considering only the claims of Brighton Bank and Copper
State, the claiins total $282,000 and as against a value of $300,000 that
only leaves $18,000 for a "cushion." When other known, although not yet

probably unknown at this time are all added in, the $18,000 above described
will probably be more than absorbed. Thus, it appears to the Court that the
interests of equity are served by allowing Brighton Bank to go forward with
its foreclosure or noji-judicial sale at this time and, if necessary, to
determine the order of priorities and have this matter resolved.
While the Court is not unmindful of the position taken by the counsel
for Copper State, even if the Court were convinced, which it is not, that
the cases in the federal bankruptcy system should have some governing
precedence in this state court matter, it would appear that the interests of
the prior lein-holder, Brighton, are such now by reason of the passage of a
substantial period* of time with the property in the hands of the liquidator
that to allow the matter to continue would be to infringe upon a perfectly
valid prior claim.
The Court does not feel that the Utah Legislature in enacting the
provisions of Title 7, Chapter 2 meant to adopt the federal bankruptcy law
nor the cases thereunder as the governing law tor the purpose of the state
courts of Utah.

Nor does this Court feel that what appears to be of a

minority rule in the bankruptcy courts as espoused by the bankruptcy of Utah
should govern herein where the historical concerns of priority would
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indicate that Brighton Bank's rights should not be interfered with by a
junior lein-holder even if that lein-holder is in a position of having come
under the protection of a proceeding by the Commissioner of Financial
Instutions. The argument that is espoused regarding the creditors not being
required to expend a substantially larger amount of money to protect a
smaller interest may make some sense if the assets had more "cushion/1 but
as noted above that cushion has disappeared in this caseThe Court feels that even using the view of the bankruptcy court the
time has came to allow Brighton Bank to exercise its interest-

To not do so

would be to allow their interest in the property to be diminished by the
decrease in the value of the asset and the increased claim for interest by
Brighton.

It's this Court's opinion that not even the bankruptcy courts in

Utah would allcw that at this point. It is further the Court1 s opinion that
the approaching point where the above scenario will start to occur to the
detriment to all of the parties who have claims against the property
constitute "cause" as required in Section 7-2-7 of the Utah Code.
It is therefore ordered that the Stay be and is hereby lifted. Brighton
Bank and all other lein claimants may proceed as against the property.

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify that a true and correct, postage prepaid copy of the foregoing
Minute Decision was sent to the following:
Steven H. Gunn
40^ ^33-ciLct ^lilding

79 South Main Street
PoO, Box 45385
Salt lake City, UT 84145-0385

Jeffrey M. Jones
215 South State, Suite 900
Salt lake City, UT 84111
Laura M- Harris
215 South State, Suite 900
Salt lake City, UT 84111
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SECTION362 (11 U.S.C. §362)
§ 362,

Automatic stay.

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a) (3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay,
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issu£Lice or employment of process, of a jud?ci?l. administrative.
or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or
could have been commenced before the commencement of the
case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or
of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against
property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property
of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a
claim that arose before the commencement of the case under
this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under
this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against
any claim against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this
title, or of an application under section 5(a) (3) of the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a) (3)), does not
operate as a stay—
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding
against the debtor;
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of
alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not
nrnnprt.v of the estate:

(3) under subsection (a^ of this section, of any act to perfect an interest in property to the extent that the trustee's
rights and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546 (b) of this title or to the extent that such act is accomplished within the period provided under section
547(e)(2)(A) of this title:
(4) under subsection i*KJO_of t t i s section, of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
• V •••: .)• : : -he-. • k:- (r }'~:> of ihkr- •'::;:, of • ' v -v. fo/cement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained
in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce
such governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a
commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker,
financial institutions, or securities clearing agency of any
mutual debt and claim under or in connection with commodity contracts, as defined in section 761(4) of this title, forward contracts, or securities contracts, as defined in section
741(7) of this title, that constitutes the setoff of a claim
against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as
defined in section 741(8) of this title, arising out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts
against cash, securities, or other property held by or due from
such commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institutions, or securities clearing agency to
margin, guarantee, secure, or settle commodity contracts,
forward contracts, or securities contracts;
(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a
repo participant, of any mutual debt and claim under or in
connection with repurchase agreements that constitutes the
setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as
defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 741(8) of this title,
arising out of repurchase agreements against cash, securities,
or other property held by or due from such repo participant
to margin, guarantee, secure or settle repurchase agreements;
(8) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement of any action by the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust in any
case in which the mortgage or deed of trust held by the Secretary is insured or was formerly insured under the National
Housing Act and covers property, or combinations of property, consisting of five or more living units;
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(9) under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance to
the debtor by a governmental unit of a notice of tax deficiency;
(10) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act by a
lessor to the debtor under a lease of nonresidential real property that has terminated by the expiration of the stated term
of the lease before the commencement of or during a case
under this title to obtain possession of such property; or
[sic ]

(11) under subsection (a) of this section, of the presentment of a negotiable instrument and the giving of notice of
and protesting dishonor of such an instrument;
(12)* under subsection (a) of this section, after the date
which is 90 days after the filing of such petition, of the commencement or continuation, and conclusion to the entry of final judgment, of an action which involves a debtor subject to
reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of this title and which
was brought by the Secretary of Transportation under the
Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 911 et seq.) (including distribution of any proceeds of sale) to foreclose a
preferred ship or fleet mortgage, or a security interest in or
relating to a vessel or vessel under construction, held by the
Secretary of Transportation under section 207 or title XI of
the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (46 App: U.S.C. 1117 and
1271 et seq., respectively), or under applicable State law; or
(13)* under subsection (a) of this section, after the date
which is 90 days after the filing of such petition, of the commencement or continuation, and conclusion to the entry of f i• [Ed. Note: Paragraphs (12) and (13) were added to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) by § 5001 of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509 (1986). Section
5001(b) of Pub. L. No. 99-509 provides:
44
the amendments made by subsection (a) of this section shall apply only to
petitions filed under section 362 of this title 11, United States Code, which are
made after August 1,1986.**

This is inaccurate. "Petitions** are not made under § 362. The proper reference probably
shoul dbe to * 'requests' * made pursuant to § 362(d).If'4 petitions'' were intended, then the
reference should be to *4 cases commenced.' *
Section 5001(a) also provides that its provisions apply only to title 11 cases
commenced before December 31,1989.
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CASE ADMINISTRATION

nal judgment, of an action which involves a debtor subject to
reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of this title and which
was brought by the Secretary of Commerce under the Ship
Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 911 et seq.) (including
distribution of any proceeds of sale) to foreclose a preferred
ship or fleet mortgage in a vessel or a mortgage, deed of trust,
or other security interest in a fishing facility held by the the
Secretary of Commerce under section 207 or title XI of the
Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and 1271 et
seq, respectively).
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this
section—
(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under
subsection (a) of this section continues until such property is
no longer property of the estate; and
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this
section continues until the earliest of—
(A) the time the case is closed;
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title concerning an individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or
13 of this title, the time a discharge is granted or denied.
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under
subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling,
modifying, or conditioning such stay—
(1) for^ause, including the lack of adequate protection of
an interest in property of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under
subsection (a) of this section, if—
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property;
and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this section for relief from the stay of any act against property of the es-
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tate under subsection (a) of this section, such stay is terminated
with respect to the party in interest making such request, unless
the court, after notice and a hearing, orders such stay continued in
effect pending the conclusion of, or as a result of, a final hearing
and determination under subsection (d) of this section. A hearing
under this subsection may be a preliminary hearing, or may be
consolidated with the final hearing under subsection (d) of this
section. The court shall order such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion of the final hearing under subsection (d) of
this section if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the conclusion of such final hearing. If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary
hearing, then such final hearing shall be commenced not later
than thirty days after the conclusion of such preliminary hearing.
(f) Upon request of a party in interest, the court, with or without a hearing, shall grant such relief from the stay provided under
subsection (a) of this section as is necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the interest of an entity in property, if such interest
will suffer such damage before there is an opportunity for notice
and a hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section.
(g) In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section
concerning relief from the stay of any act under subsection (a) of
this section—
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of
proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in property; and
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof
on all other issues.
(h) An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay
provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including
costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may
recover punitive damages.

Legislative History
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from
his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that
drove him into bankruptcy.

